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We argue that the common-law standard of proof, given the rules
of evidence, does not minimize expected error as usually argued in
the legal literature, but may well be efficient from the standpoint
of providing maximal incentives for socially desirable behavior.
By contrast, civil law’s higher but somewhat imprecise standard
may be interpreted as reflecting a trade-off between providing
incentives and avoiding judicial error per se. In our model, the
optimal judicial system has rules resembling those in the com-
mon law when providing incentives is paramount. When greater
weight is given to avoiding error, the optimal system has civil-law
features. (JEL: D 8, K 4)
1 Introduction
A striking difference between the common-law and civil-law systems is the
standard of proof in civil disputes. In common law, the party with the
burden of proof need only prove his claim by a so-called “preponderance
of evidence” (or on a “balance of probabilities”). A claimant’s assertion is
deemed established if it appears more likely true than not true, given the
evidence presented to the court. By contrast, civil-law courts ordinarily re-
quire a higher degree of certainty, often described in terms of moral certainty
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or as intime conviction, and sometimes also said to be akin to the standard
for criminal cases.1 This points to a fundamental divergence between the
two major legal systems with respect to the notion of proof in civil trials. A
practical implication is that a plaintiff succeeding under common law could
well have lost before a civil-law court.
Among common-law scholars, the usual justification for the preponder-
ance standard is that it minimizes the frequency of mistakes. This seems
an appropriate objective in that type I and type II errors (i.e., erroneously
ruling against the defendant and against the plaintiff, respectively) may be
taken to have equal weights in a civil dispute. From basic decision theory,
it is well known that a decision rule prescribing the rejection of the less
probable hypothesis minimizes expected error.2 The common-law standard
of proof therefore appears to be efficient from the standpoint of establish-
ing the truth on average. This raises the question of what substantive aims
might be pursued by the more stringent civil-law standard.
Sherwin and Clermont [2002] discuss several possible reasons, but
conclude that the most satisfactory is a quest for legitimacy: “The civil law
may retain its high standard with the aim of increasing the apparent legit-
imacy of judicial decisions.. . . The standard of intime conviction insinuates
to the parties and the public that judges will not treat facts as true on less
than certain evidence” (pp. 241, 244).3 At first sight, this would seem to
suggest that civil-law countries care more about mistakes. However, a strong
standard only makes it more difficult for the party with the burden of proof
to prevail and is in fact at odds with error minimization on average, con-
sidering both type I and type II errors. Thus, in this view, the divergence
is between the error minimization strategy pursued by common law and the
legitimacy-seeking strategy of civil law, legitimacy being obtained by requir-
ing very convincing evidence to rule in favor of the party with the burden of
1“In continental European law, no distinction is made between civil and criminal cases
with regard to the standard of proof. In both, such a high degree of probability is required
that, to the degree that this is possible in the ordinary experience of life itself, doubts
are excluded and probability approaches certitude.” (Nagel, Evidence, in Encyclopaedia
Britannica: Macropaedia, 1974). This opinion is arguably extreme.
2See De Groot [1970]. Reference to this result in the legal literature is relatively
recent and owes to the development of Bayesian decision theory in the 1950s. See for
instance Brook [1982] and the references therein.
3Other possible reasons discussed by the authors are that civil law may be mainly
concerned with settling disputes, irrespective of the “quality” of the settlement, or that it
seeks to discourage suits, thus reducing litigation costs.
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proof.
Sherwin and Clermont also note that there are other, subtle differences
in the approach to judicial proof. First, the common-law standard is well
articulated and has been much commented upon. In applications, it is both
invariant and relatively unambiguous. Contrariwise, “civil law does not enun-
ciate its civil standard too expressly, loudly, or frequently” (p. 245). While
a strong one, the standard of intime conviction is in practice somewhat
variable: “Civil law judges likely apply a haphazardly variable civil stan-
dard” (p. 247). Secondly, whether through legal presumptions or through
the judge’s interventions, civil law courts are more prone to shifts in the
burden of proof, be it on the basis of access to proof or of likelihood of
contention.4 Given a high standard, shifting the burden will at times be de-
terminant for the outcome of the trial. In negligence trials, when the burden
is on the defendant to prove due care, this is sometimes interpreted as an
implicit move towards strict liability. Thirdly, in contrast to the civil law’s
free evaluation principle, it is well known that evidentiary rules in common
law impose specific constraints on court decision-making, in particular the
inadmissibility of seemingly relevant evidence.
While Sherwin and Clermont’s legitimacy-versus-error-minimization in-
terpretation is not unconvincing, one may question whether it fits the three
stylized facts just described. In the present paper we suggest an alternative,
and in some respects symmetrical, explanation for the divergence between
the common-law and civil-law standards.
Our argument draws on Demougin and Fluet [2002].5 In that pa-
per, we analyze the issue of establishing negligence when evidence about a
tort-feasor’s behavior is imperfect. Thus, we consider litigation about discre-
tionary actions. We show that in this context common-law evidentiary rules
are in fact inconsistent with error minimization. The reason is straightfor-
ward. To give an example, suppose it were known from sociological studies
that female physicians are generally more likely to exert due care than male
physicians. Would this “fact” be allowed to influence the court’s decision
in a medical liability suit? Presumably not. According to the usual ex-
clusionary rules, neither would evidence of similar facts (e.g., whether the
physician was found negligent on other occasions) or evidence of character or
4The theory is to impose the burden of proving a claim on the party who seeks to
upset an existing situation or to demonstrate something contrary to the “normal” state
of affairs.
5For a similar intuition see also Lando [2002].
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of a general reputation for behaving negligently or diligently. However, the
decision-theoretic error minimization argument – i.e., updating probabilities
on the basis of all available information – requires that any evidence bearing
on the likelihood of a claim being true be taken into account.
On the other hand, we also show that preponderance of evidence together
with exclusionary rules has a very striking property: it maximizes incentives
to exert due care. Thus, common-law rules may not be efficient from the
point of view of minimizing expected error, as usually argued in the legal
literature, but they may well be so from the standpoint of providing incentives
for socially desirable behavior. To emphasize, fact-avoiding evidentiary rules
are generally inconsistent with “truth-seeking” but are useful in providing
incentives.6 This suggests that the substantive aim underlying the common-
law standard of proof may be deterrence rather than error minimization.
If this is correct, how are we then to interpret the more stringent civil-law
standard?
A first observation is that, if the common law does not minimize error,
requiring more convincing proof than under common law is not necessar-
ily inconsistent with less error on average. Moreover, if civil law also cares
about deterrence, its high but seemingly imprecise standard of proof may
result from the particular trade-off it strikes between avoiding error and pro-
viding incentives. The civil-law standard would appear imprecise because the
judicial system takes into account the a priori likelihood of the claim being
true and the social loss from inappropriate deterrence. Thirdly, as shown
in the remainder of the paper, this interpretation will be reinforced if it is
observed that the burden of proof is at times shifted against the party with
the a priori less likely contention.
To investigate this hypothesis, we consider a simple model where society
may be concerned both with providing incentives and with avoiding judicial
error. Obviously, error also matters from a pure deterrence point of view
– see Polinsky and Shavell [1989] and Kaplow and Shavell [1994].
What we have in mind is that error per se may be a concern. Perhaps this
captures legitimacy-seeking, as suggested by Sherwin and Clermont, but a
concern for error per se could as well be interpreted as a concern for fairness
in the sense of Kaplow and Shavell [1999]. As pointed out, there is in
general a trade-off between the objectives of avoiding error and providing
6See Fluet [2003] for a comparison of the equilibrium outcome under truth-seeking
courts versus courts constrained by rules of evidence.
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deterrence. Their relative weight in society’s utility function will be reflected
in the characteristics of the judicial system (rules of procedure, standard of
proof, etc.). When providing incentives is paramount, the optimal judicial
system is shown to have rules resembling those in the common law. When
greater weight is given to avoiding error, the optimal system has civil-law
features, including a higher but apparently imprecise standard of proof and
a greater propensity to shifts in the burden of proof.7
The paper develops as follows. The next section presents the basic model.
Section 3 analyzes the trade-off between deterrence and avoiding error. Sec-
tion 4 shows how the optimal solution relates to stylized characteristics of
the judicial systems. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We use the same basic model as in Demougin and Fluet [2002]. Specifi-
cally, potential tort-feasors undertake a socially valuable activity, which may
impose an accidental loss of amount L on a third party. The probability of
causing harm depends only on the potential injurers’ level of care, which is
either h or l with probability of accident pl > ph > 0. The opportunity cost
of high care is c and is distributed according to the cumulative distribution
function G(c), with corresponding density g(c) and support [0, c]. The in-
terpretation is that potential tort-feasors have different characteristics and
therefore face different costs of care. Alternatively, an individual’s cost of
care depends on the circumstances in which he finds himself.
All individuals are risk-neutral. High care is the socially efficient action
if it minimizes the sum of the cost of care and expected accident losses, that
is, if
(1) phL+ c < plL, or equivalently, c < (pl − ph)L.
Although injurers may face different costs of care, the above condition is
assumed to hold in all circumstances. Thus, c ≤ (pl − ph)L.
Under the strict liability rule, individuals are held liable for any harm they
may cause. This obviously induces socially efficient care provided causation
7The economic literature on standards of proof has also focused on judicial error, but
mainly in the context of criminal trials and usually with exogenously given type I and
type II error costs (see Rubenfeld and Sappington [1987], Miceli [1991], and Davis
[1994]).
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is always established without error and injurers have sufficient wealth to pay
damages in full. We assume L is large compared to the injurers’ wealth w.
Since an injurer can then pay at most w if held liable, his private incentives
are aligned with those of society if
(2) c < (pl − ph)w ≡ cS.
Individuals with cost of care above cS undertake inadequate care, while others
produce first-best care.
Under the negligence rule, an injurer is held liable following the occurrence
of harm only if he is found to have exerted inadequate care. As is well
known, the negligence rule may to some extent alleviate the inefficiency due
to the injurers’ limited wealth (see Shavell [1986]). When care is observed
without error, a potential injurer exerts due care if c < plw. Since plw > cS,
more injurers are consequently induced to behave efficiently than under strict
liability. We assume
(3) plw < c,
which means that some potential injurers remain undeterred even under a
perfect negligence rule.
Suppose now that an injurer’s behavior is only imperfectly observable
following the occurrence of harm. Hence, mistakes will be made under any
negligence rule. Moreover, an injurer’s cost of care, c, is private information.
Which party bears the burden of persuasion and how evidence is evaluated
characterize the negligence rule under consideration and determine the prob-
ability of being found negligent, given the level of care and the quality of
the evidence likely to be available. We denote with αh the probability of a
“false positive” or type I error – the injurer is found negligent even though he
produced high care; similarly, 1 − αl is the probability of a “false negative”
or type II error – the injurer is not held liable even though he underproduced
care. An injurer exercises due care if
(4) c ≤ (plαl − phαh)w ≡ cN .
How αh and αl depend on legal rules is analyzed in the next sections.
Society is concerned both with incentives and with judicial error. Under
the strict liability rule, given the present assumptions, there is no scope for
mistakes, because no claim is ever made about an injurer’s behavior – there is
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no error, given that causation is always established. Society’s loss is therefore
equal to the expected primary costs, defined as the sum of the cost of care
and accident losses, that is,
(5) VS =
∫ cS
0
(c+ phL) g(c) dc+ [1−G(cS)] plL .
Under a negligence rule, primary costs will in general differ, and there is
the additional social loss associated with judicial error. The total social loss
under a negligence rule is written as
VN =
∫ cN
0
(c+ phL) g(c) dc+ [1−G(cN)] plL(6)
+λ {G(cN)phαh + [1−G(cN)] pl(1− αl)} .
The first two terms refer to primary costs, as under strict liability. In the
third term, the quantity inside the curly brackets is the probability of judicial
error. The parameter λ ≥ 0 is the weight of judicial error in society’s loss
function.
As already emphasized, the characteristics of the judicial system deter-
mine αh and αl, and therefore cN . When a negligence rule is used, it should
be structured so as to minimize VN , thus taking into account both the proba-
bility of error and incentives to take care. Society could also decide instead to
use the strict liability rule for a particular class of harm. Obviously, if society
dislikes judicial error, the negligence rule is used only if it provides sufficiently
more deterrence than strict liability, i.e., if cN > cS by an adequate margin.
3 Trade-offs between Deterrence and Error
The mere occurrence of an accident provides indirect information about an
injurer’s care, since the probability of accident is greater with low care. Any
additional evidence that might be used to infer care levels is taken to be
summarized by the random variable x, with cumulative distribution functions
Fh(x) and Fl(x) depending on the level of care actually exerted and with
density functions fh(x) and fl(x), both with the same support. We assume
the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) and take the likelihood ratio
fl(x)/fh(x) to be strictly decreasing in x.
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As a preliminary step, consider the expression for VN in (7). Clearly, for
any given level of type I error αh, society would want the type II error 1−αl
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to be as small as possible. First, this would reduce the overall probability of
error, which matters if λ > 0; secondly, from (4) a larger αl increases the cost
threshold cN , which means that more injurers exert due care. From Neyman
and Pearson’s lemma, an efficient test of hypothesis – maximizing αl for a
given αh – requires that the null hypothesis “care was h” be rejected when
fl(x) > kfh(x), for some constant k. Given MLRP, the null hypothesis is
therefore rejected when x < x̂, where the critical value x̂ depends on the
allowed type I error and is determined by αh = Fh(x̂). We write αl(αh) for
the maximized αl as a function of αh. It is easily verified that this function
is increasing and concave. Specifically,
α′l(αh) =
fl(x)
fh(x)
> 0,(7)
α′′l (αh) =
d [fl(x)/fh(x)]
dx
(
1
fh(x)
)
< 0, where αh = Fh(x).(8)
Moreover, αl(0) = 0 and αl(1) = 1.
As noted above, because of the risk of judicial error, a negligence rule
should only be used if it induces a sufficiently greater proportion of individ-
uals to exert due care than with strict liability. From (2) and (4), cN > cS is
equivalent to
(9) δ ≡ plαl − phαh > pl − ph .
We refer to δ as the level of deterrence under the set of rules inducing the
particular αh and αl. Specifically, deterrence is the increase in the probability
of being held liable when low rather than high care is exerted. The condition
(9) holds if for some type I error
(10) δ(αh) = plαl(αh)− phαh > pl − ph.
Before considering the conditions under which this inequality is satisfied, we
first characterize the relationship between efficient tests of hypothesis and
deterrence.
8This is without loss of generality. Suppose the evidence is multidimensional and cor-
responds to the random vector (x1, . . . , xn) with density functions ϕh(x1, . . . , xn) and
ϕl(x1, . . . , xn). Then the value of the ratio ϕh/ϕl is itself a scalar random variable satis-
fying MLRP. Moreover, it summarizes all that is relevant in the underlying evidence.
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Lemma 1 Consider an efficient test rejecting the null hypothesis “care was
h” when plfl(x) > kphfh(x) and accepting the hypothesis when plfl(x) <
kphfh(x), for some given k. Then the corresponding type I error αh satisfies
(11) δ′(αh) = ph(k − 1)
if (11) has a solution. Otherwise, either δ′(0) < ph(k − 1) and αh = 0 or
δ′(1) > ph(k − 1) and αh = 1.
In the lemma, the expression pjfj(x) is the probability of an accident occur-
ring and of observing the additional evidence x, conditional on the level of
care j. In statistical terminology, it would also be referred to as the “likeli-
hood” of care level j, given the occurrence of an accident and the realization
x. Thus, k is the critical relative likelihood of low versus high care under
a test using these “data.” A larger k means a greater reluctance to reject
the null hypothesis that the injurer exerted high care. From (11), given the
concavity of the deterrence function, this implies a smaller type I error and
therefore a larger type II error. Moreover, since the associated αh is unique,
k uniquely determines the level of deterrence achieved.
Proposition 1 There exists a negligence rule satisfying cN > cS if and only
if phfh(x) > plfl(x) for some x.
The condition in the proposition is about the quality of the evidence. A
negligence rule may provide more deterrence than strict liability only if there
is a possibility that high care appears more likely than low care following
the occurrence of harm.9 We now characterize the test of hypothesis that
maximizes deterrence.
Proposition 2 Deterrence is maximized if the injurer is held liable when
plfl(x) > phfh(x) and is not held liable when plfl(x) < phfh(x).
Thus, deterrence is maximized for the particular test of hypothesis obtained
by setting k = 1. In words, incentives to exert care are greatest if the
injurer is held liable when it appears “more likely than not” that he exerted
inadequate care. Observe that the deterrence-maximizing decision rule has a
remarkably simple formulation, which applies irrespective of the particulars
9The extreme case of absolutely uninformative evidence corresponds to fh(x) = fl(x)
for all x. Any realization x is equally probable given either h or l. The condition of
Proposition 1 is then not satisfied, since pl > ph.
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of the situation. We next characterize the optimal trade-off between the
provision of incentives and the avoidance of error.
Proposition 3 Suppose it is optimal for society to choose a negligence rule
inducing the cost threshold cN > cS. If λ > 0, deterrence is not maximized
and there exists α0h < α
1
h satisfying
(12) cN = wδ(α
0
h) = wδ(α
1
h),
such that the chosen rule has type I error α0h if G(cN) > 1/2 and type I error
α1h if G(cN) < 1/2.
The argument is illustrated in Figure 1. Deterrence can be greater than under
strict liability (which amounts to setting αh = 1) only when the condition
of Proposition 1 is satisfied. Any level of deterrence above that under strict
liability, but below maximum deterrence, is then consistent with two values
for the type I error. One of these two values leads to a smaller overall
probability of error. The smaller type I error (and hence the larger type II
error) is preferable when due care is a priori more likely than inadequate
care; that is, when the proportion G(cN) of injurers exerting due care is
greater than one-half. In contrast, there is a unique value of the type I error
consistent with maximizing deterrence (labeled α∗h in the figure).
Figure 1
Deterrence Curve
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It is straightforward to analyze the comparative statics of the solution. A
larger accidental loss L shifts the trade-off towards providing more deterrence,
at the cost of more frequent errors. In the figure, this means a shift from
either α0h or α
1
h towards α
∗
h. For instance, suppose the rule is characterized
by the smaller type I error α0h, which means that a majority of potential
injurers exert due care. Larger accidental losses imply that deterrence is now
relatively more valuable. As a result, in order to provide more incentives
to exert care, society should be less reluctant to find an injurer negligent.
This leads to an increase in the type I error and to a smaller type II error.
Nevertheless, the overall probability of error increases, since careful injurers
are more numerous than negligent ones. A greater weight λ accorded to
judicial error would have the opposite effects.
4 Legal Rules
The foregoing section analyzed the solution to society’s problem but did not
explicitly consider the relationship with legal rules. The focus was on solving
a simple principal–agent problem, given the preferences of society as principal
and assuming that evidence about injurers’ behavior was exogenously made
available. The issue of legal rules arises when one considers how implemen-
tation of the optimal mechanism can be delegated to courts. The question
is then what set of rules (rules of procedure, standard of proof, etc.) will
lead courts to choose the socially efficient solution and whether, in fact, this
is at all possible through general rules, which by definition must operate in
circumstances that cannot be foreseen in detail.
Consider first the case where society is not concerned with judicial error,
that is, λ = 0. Then legal rules should be structured so as to maximize
deterrence. We know from Proposition 2 that there exists a simple, invariant
decision rule that does this and under which “priors” concerning the propor-
tion of injurers exerting due care are irrelevant. One possible formulation of a
legal rule is then as follows: Put the burden of proof on the victim, disregard
any information about “priors,” and consider negligence to be proved if and
only if the likelihood of low versus high care satisfies
(13)
plfl(x)
phfh(x)
> k,
using the particular standard of proof defined by k = 1. Alternatively, put
the burden of proof on the injurer, and consider due care to be proved –
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thereby allowing the injurer to escape liability – if and only if
(14)
phfh(x)
plfl(x)
> k,
under the standard of proof k = 1. In either case, this implements the “more
likely than not” criterion defined in Proposition 2.
In the above formulation, the standard of proof refers to the minimum
likelihood threshold for proving a claim. This captures the notions such as
the “weight of evidence” or “weight of proof” required to convince the court.
The assignment of the burden of proof refers to who must prove what. Thus,
if the victim has the burden of proving the defendant’s negligence, the burden
of proof is discharged if the evidence shows that negligence is more than k
times more likely than due care, where k is the threshold weight of evidence
required. Conversely, if the burden is on the injurer to prove due care, the
burden is discharged only if due care is more than k times more likely than
negligence. When k is greater than unity and large, who bears the burden
will obviously matter. By contrast, when the threshold is k = 1, which may
be interpreted as the common law’s preponderance-of-evidence standard, the
allocation of the burden of proof has no effect on deterrence.10 Note that,
since evidence is taken to be exogenous, a party does not need to actually
produce it. The concept of burden of proof is therefore used here in the sense
of the “burden of persuasion” rather than the “burden of production.”11
The appropriate legal rules can also be described in more Bayesian terms
as follows. Courts should approach each case with equal “normative” prob-
ability priors about whether the injurer exerted h or l, they should update
only on the basis of admissible evidence, and they should find in favor of the
party with the burden of proof if the posterior probability of his claim exceeds
50%. Evidence about the proportion of injurers exerting due care would not
be admissible. In summary, we have the following characterization.
Corollary 1 When λ = 0, an optimal legal rule is to disregard evidence
about priors with respect to injurers’ behavior and to put the burden of per-
10In the present formulation, the evidence set satisfying plfl(x) = phfh(x) has measure
zero, but this need not be the case when x is multidimensional. With k = 1, shifting the
burden from one party to the other could then affect the type I and II errors, although
with no effect on deterrence.
11In Demougin and Fluet [2002] we also discuss the role of presumptions and burden
of proof when parties can manipulate the evidence.
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suasion indifferently on the victim or on the injurer, with the standard of
proof k = 1.
Consider now the case where society is also concerned with judicial error.
Obviously, priors then become relevant. More to the point, there now seems
to be no simple formulation for the set of rules allowing implementation to
be delegated to courts. In particular, one may question whether the concept
of standard of proof, as defined above, is at all useful. The problem is
that the optimal critical likelihood ratio now depends on many factors and
will differ between situations. Thus, the optimal trade-off between avoiding
error and providing incentives will depend on the severity of losses in the
category of cases considered, on the proportion of injurers with a high cost of
effort, on the productivity of effort in reducing expected losses, etc. Suppose
courts indeed implement the socially efficient solution. To an outside observer
bent on interpreting court decisions in terms of a standard of proof, the
implicit standard would then necessarily appear “haphazardly variable,” to
use Sherwin and Clermont’s words.
It is nevertheless possible to provide some characterization. Suppose αh
is the optimal type I error in some particular class of cases, given that society
cares about judicial error. From Lemma 1, assuming 0 < αh < 1, there exists
a constant kv satisfying
(15) δ′(αh) = ph(kv − 1)
and such that the injurer is found liable only if plfl(x) > kvphfh(x). From
the above discussion, this corresponds to the burden of proof being on the
victim and to the use of the standard of proof kv. Equivalently, the same αh
also satisfies
(16) δ′(αh) = ph
(
1
ki
− 1
)
,
where ki is such that the injurer avoids liability only if phfh(x) > kiplfl(x).
This corresponds to putting on the injurer the burden of proving due care,
with the standard ki. Now, by Proposition 3, if inadequate care is a priori
unlikely, δ′(αh) > 0 and therefore kv > 1. If due care is a priori unlikely,
δ′(αh) < 0 and therefore ki > 1. Thus, we have the following.
Corollary 2 When λ > 0, an optimal legal rule is for the victim to bear
the burden of proving negligence if inadequate care is a priori unlikely, and
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otherwise for the injurer to bear the burden of proving due care. In either
case, the standard of proof satisfies k > 1 and is decreasing in the amount of
loss L.
Corollary 1 suggested that, at least when the issue in dispute is the de-
fendant’s behavior, providing incentives rather than minimizing error better
captures the characteristics of evidentiary rules and standard of proof in the
common law. Corollary 2 suggests that the higher and imprecise standard
used in civil-law courts, together with the more frequent shifts in the burden
of proof, can be rationalized as resulting from a concern for judicial error.
The argument is straightforward. First, using the concept of standard of
proof borrowed from common law, it is possible to rationalize the use of a
higher standard than preponderance if society trades off deterrence and er-
ror. Secondly, in this rationalization, the burden of proof will be on the party
with the less likely contention. Thirdly, the appropriate standard would de-
pend on circumstances, for instance, the importance of providing incentives
as captured in the corollary by L.
5 Concluding Comments
Our paper suggests caution in interpreting what legal systems do or attempt
to do. Standards of proof are major conceptual tools in the common law.
Regarding the preponderance standard, the error-minimization interpreta-
tion is a well-established view, although common-law scholars are usually at
pains to reconcile it with exclusionary rules. Starting with the premise that
the preponderance standard minimizes expected error and approaching the
notion of proof in civil law through the common law’s notion of standards of
proof, one is drawn to the conclusion that civil law accords less importance
to seeking the truth.
This raises the question of what the civil law is in fact up to. The above
thesis is clearly not without merit, and we do not claim to have the final
word. However, as our analysis shows, it can also reasonably be argued that
error minimization is a misconception of what the common law actually does.
Specifically, it is a mistake to focus on the standard of proof without also
taking exclusionary rules into account. One possible implication is then that
civil law may, after all, accord more importance to truth-seeking.
Another implication of our analysis concerns the usefulness of simple
rules, such as standards of proof in the common-law sense. Simple, un-
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ambiguous rules are appropriate only if the judicial system pursues simple
aims, such as either maximizing incentives or minimizing average error.12
With more multidimensional aims, formulating a simple rule that will be ef-
ficient across a variety of situations does not appear feasible. In other words,
more discretion is needed in order to take into account the various trade-offs
in particular situations. Preponderance of evidence is certainly less equivocal
than intime conviction or the equivalent, but it also allows the judge much
less discretion. Perhaps some degree of fuzziness is useful if court rulings are
to reflect conflicting aims.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 The result follows from the concavity of δ(αh), i.e.,
δ′′(αh) = plα′′l (αh) < 0, and noting that
δ′(αh) = plα′l(αh)− ph
= pl
fl(x)
fh(x)
− ph, where αh = Fh(x).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1 Since δ(1) = pl− ph, the condition (10) holds if
and only if δ′(αh) < 0 for some αh < 1. Suppose plfl(x) ≥ phfh(x) for all x.
From the lemma, this implies that (11) does not have a solution for k < 1,
and therefore δ′(αh) ≥ 0 for all αh. Conversely, suppose δ′(αh) < 0 for some
αh < 1. Then (11) has a solution for some k < 1. But the associated test
then accepts the null hypothesis over a set of positive measure such that
phfh(x) ≥ plfl(x)
k
> plfl(x).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 δ(0) = 0 < pl − ph = δ(1); hence deterrence is
maximized for some αh > 0. If the maximum is an interior one, δ
′(αh) = 0
and the lemma implies a test of hypothesis with k = 1. If the maximum
12We focused on a very simple setup where minimizing primary costs led to a simple
decision rule. In fact, as shown by Gaube [2005], simple decision rules are not always
feasible even when objectives are unidimensional.
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is a corner solution at αh = 1, then cN = cS and Proposition 1 implies
plfl(x) ≥ phfh(x) for all x. Hence, a test of hypothesis with k = 1 also
maximizes deterrence. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 Write VN as a function of αh in (7), noting that
cN = wδ(αh). The first-order condition for minimizing VN is
V ′N(αh) = {cN − (pl − ph)L+ λ[phαh − pl(1− αl)]} g(cN)wδ′(αh)
(17)
+λ {G(cN)ph − [1−G(cN)]plα′l(αh)} = 0.
cN > cS implies αh < 1. Suppose, contrary to the claim, that deterrence is
maximized. Then δ′(αh) = plα′l(αh)− ph = 0 and therefore
V ′N(αh) = λ {G(cN)ph − [1−G(cN)]plα′l(αh)}
= λph[2G(cN)− 1],
implying that (17) can then be satisfied only if G(cN) = 1/2, which is non-
generic. Thus, generically, the solution is characterized by δ′(αh) 6= 0, and
deterrence is not maximized. Since cN > cS, we have δ(αh) > pl− ph = δ(1).
Given the concavity of δ(αh) and the fact that δ(0) = 0, there exist α
0
h and
α1h satisfying (12), as claimed (see Figure 1). It follows that
VN(α
0
h)− VN(α1h) = λ
{
G(cN)phα
0
h + [1−G(cN)] pl(1− αl(α0h)
}
(18)
− λ {G(cN)phα1h + [1−G(cN)] pl(1− αl(α1h)}
= λph(α
0
h − α1h)[2G(cN)− 1],
where the last equality follows from
plαl(α
0
h)− phα0h = δ(α0h) = δ(α1h) = plαl(α1h)− phα1h.
Since α0h < α
1
h, we have VN(α
0
h) < VN(α
1
h) when G(cN) > 1/2, implying that
the rule with α0h should then be chosen; likewise, when G(cN) < 1/2, the rule
with α1h should be chosen. Q.E.D.
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